Correspondence about the paper should be directed to Sandra Milberg. Authors= names are alphabetical to denote equal contributions. We acknowledge the helpful comments of Catherine Langlois and Jack Swasy on an earlier version of this paper. This research was partially supported by the Credit Research Center at Georgetown University.
Introduction
A central paradigm of marketing is exchange. In fact, marketing has been defined as a process of creating and maintaining exchange relationships (see for example Bagozzi 1975) . While marketing scholars have broadened the concept of exchange to include social marketing and other non-economic transactions, customer relationships have typically been operationalized in terms of a utilitarian exchange where goods or services are given in return for money or other goods. We call this exchange the Afirst exchange.@ In the past, marketing has focused almost exclusively on managing the first exchange.
However, transactions between customer and marketer also include the transfer of customer information generated as a by-product of the transaction with the marketer. The ongoing flow of customer information is essential to developing and maintaining strong marketing relationships. Customer information enables firms to identify their target markets, to customize their product lines to meet the needs of these markets, and to enhance customer satisfaction. But productive and strategic use of consumer information requires careful management.
We will argue in this paper that more successful and strategic management of customer information can be achieved if it is viewed as one side of an exchange process that involves reducing perceived risks of information disclosure and the granting of customized benefits and services as an explicit counterpart to the acquisition of information. Thus, the first exchange of goods or services for money is accompanied by what we will call a Asecond exchange@ of personal information for a variety of customized tangible or intangible benefits (Glazer 1991; Milne and Gordon 1993) . A major goal of this paper is to change the way marketers typically view the acquisition and use of consumer information from a one-way proposition where the information is often viewed as an entitlement, to a reciprocal exchange process.
It is useful to note that the exchange of information can occur independent of a completed transaction. For example, consumers disclose a large amount of personal information when they apply for a mortgage, but those who do not qualify do not participate in the first exchange. Nonetheless, the information they provided may be used to market other products or services to them. On the Internet, web browsing allows the exchange of information to occur without the first exchange. Because online systems provide the capability to record a consumer=s Amouse tracks,@ organizations are able to record how consumers move through their web sites and to profile their browsing which was formerly a passive, private activity, independent of whether or not the consumer makes a purchase. Based on these profiles, consumers may receive targeted advertising or content the next time they visit the web site.
Strategic management of the second exchange requires recognition of the risks and benefits to consumers. In general, consumers engage in the first exchange if the benefits of the offering exceed the risks such as the possibility of poor product performance. The same we argue holds true for the second exchange: consumers will disclose personal information if the benefits of disclosure exceed the risks. Today, the primary risk associated with the second exchange is invasion of privacy. To support our arguments, we develop a model that demonstrates how managing consumer information flows as an exchange process impacts customer acquisition and retention and thus, the firm=s bottom line. The model and the strategic implications of successful management of the second exchange are discussed in the second part of this paper. In the next section, we first describe the how modern information technology drives both the potential benefits and the potential risks of the Asecond exchange.@ We also illustrate negative outcomes that can result from a failure to manage consumer information as a second exchange.
The Second Exchange

Modern Information Technology: Opportunities and Threats
In a world where organizations can no longer personally know their customers, information technology is revolutionizing the practice of marketing. These changes are driven by advances in information technology combined with a competitive imperative to serve customers as individuals. Information technology now makes it possible for marketers to efficiently gather, store, use, and exchange vast amounts of personal information needed to create more customized benefits for customers in a business environment characterized by largely anonymous, impersonal relationships (Bessen, 1993; Blattberg and Deighton, 1991; Glazer, 1991) . Table 1 adapted from Culnan and Armstrong (1998) illustrates what data can potentially be gathered by the organization during a sales transaction, depending on the technology employed at the point-of-sale. For example, at one end of the spectrum, a face-to-face cash transaction, essentially no information about the transaction is recorded. However, at the other end, as customers move online, all of their electronic footprints can potentially be recorded.
---Insert Table 1 About Here C It is the increased availability of customer information enabled by information technology that has allowed companies to make, what some consider to be, a fundamental shift in their focus toward relationship or 1-to-1 marketing. The focus of relationship marketing is on establishing and maintaining on-going, mutually beneficial relationships with individual customers (Berry 1995; Berry and Parasuraman 1991; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 1987; Peppers and Rogers 1993) . This shift toward relationship marketing can be attributed, in part, to the realization that a small percentage of a firm=s customers make the greatest contribution to a firm=s profitability. The most valuable long-term customers generate an increased quantifiable return to the firm as a result of their lifetime value (Peppers and Rogers 1993) .
A key factor for establishing and maintaining 1-to-1 marketing relationships is customer information. Initial information used for prospecting may be obtained from outside sources, but to develop and maintain customer relationships, customers themselves must provide the information through transactions and dialogue. Direct dialogue with customers will generally provide the most accurate and useful information about their preferences, desires, and intentions. The more information obtained, the more effectively and efficiently marketers can serve their customers, which in turn, builds commitment to the relationship (Glazer 1991; Pepper and Rogers 1993) .
More specifically, consumer information enables firms to more precisely target and attract potential customers as well as to create switching costs that increase loyalty of current customers. It also permits firms to fulfill responsibilities throughout the value chain by providing warranties, customer service, and product use and safety information.
Moreover, it provides organizations with opportunities to customize product offerings and offer personalized service such as loyalty programs, co-branded credit cards, and advertising messages on customer billing statements tailored to the customer=s buying patterns. In sum, successful marketing relies on gathering more and more personal information to build a committed, trusting relationship where information serves as a substitute for first-hand knowledge of the individual (Gutek 1995) . Clearly, these practices benefit consumers as well as marketers as they potentially reduce the number of unwanted commercial intrusions, provide consumers more choices, and help serve customers more effectively and efficiently (Bessen 1993; Blattberg and Deighton 1991 ).
Yet the same rapid advances in technology that create benefits for both consumers and organizations simultaneously raise privacy concerns (Baker 1973; Bloom, Milne and Adler 1994; Culnan 1993; Culnan and Armstrong 1998; Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993; Godwin 1993; Moorman and Price 1989; Smith, Milberg and Burke 1996) . Privacy is the ability of the individual to control the terms under which personal information is acquired and used (Westin 1967) . Personal information is information that can be associated with an identifiable individual. Privacy concerns can arise from gaining unauthorized access to personal information or from secondary use --collecting information for one purpose and subsequently using it for other purposes. Here, our focus is on the latter: privacy concerns that may arise as a result of the business decisions firms make about using the customer information they have gathered.
To date, most firms have had a reactive rather than a strategic orientation to consumer privacy because they seem to believe that there is no readily apparent competitive dynamic in the marketplace that justifies a more proactive approach (Baker 1973; Jones 1991; Smith 1994) . The view that customer information should be treated as part of an exchange process implies that consumer privacy concerns can be leveraged for strategic advantage. A more strategic approach toward consumer privacy reduces the risks of the second exchange and enhances the benefits of information disclosure to increase the attractiveness of the exchange for consumers.
Thus, in today=s world where consumers leave more and more Aelectronic footprints,@ the use of customer information can be viewed as involving a trade-off between risks and benefits affecting marketers and consumers alike. Behind a successful marketing relationship, dependent on the on-going flow of consumer information, is the explicit recognition that the use of this information is associated both with addressing consumers= concerns about privacy and the delivery of explicit and attractive benefits to the consumer.
Successful management of the second exchange therefore, involves communicating to consumers both the benefits and the procedures implemented to reduce the risks (privacy concerns) associated with the disclosure of personal information.
Media accounts of mismanagement of the second exchange are relatively frequent.
These strategic missteps can have several negative consequences for firms. First, they can raise consumer privacy concerns and lead to perceptions that the marketer has breached the relationship, resulting in customer defection (Fournier, Dobscha and Mick 1998, Oliver and Swan 1989; Peppers and Rogers 1993; Schrage 1998) . Second, they can jeopardize use of customer information for legitimate marketing programs. Finally, well-publicized incidents can and have resulted in unwanted government scrutiny and regulation. Thus, the failure to manage consumer information as part of an exchange process that takes into account both the risks and benefits for consumers has important strategic implications as the following examples illustrate.
Insufficient Disclosure: Second Exchange Failures
In 1995, Ram Avrahami sued U.S. News and World Report under a Virginia misappropriation of property law because U.S. News had rented his name on a mailing list to the Smithsonian without his consent and the Smithsonian had subsequently solicited him.
The U.S. News argument that Avrahami had no claim because he renewed his subscription illustrates the failure to understand the importance of the second exchange (Alberta 1995) .
Avrahami was satisfied with the first exchange -the magazine itself, but not with the second exchange. U.S. News failed to communicate any benefits Avrahami would accrue from marketing use of his personal information. To the contrary, rather than providing Avrahami with a benefit in the form of access to potentially interesting offers, U.S. News was using his personal information, from his viewpoint, in objectionable ways. In this case, the failure to recognize customer information as part of a second exchange led to customer dissatisfaction reflected by Avrahami filing his lawsuit.
Another example involves the failure to adequately communicate the benefits to customers prior to using sensitive personal information. In February 1998, the Washington Post ran a front page story describing how two large pharmacies contracted with an independent database marketing company to develop a customer communications program based on customer information disclosed to the pharmacies --records generated when customers filled their prescriptions. Using customer information generated through these transactions, it was possible to infer patients= condition from the medication prescribed and non-compliance --whether or not patients were taking their medicine based on refills. The database marketing firm would send personalized letters on the pharmacies= letterhead reminding customers to renew their prescriptions and would also notify them about new drugs. (Friend 1995; Health Promotion Associates 1995) . Second, a large majority of consumers want more information about prescription medicines (PMAC n.d.).
After the story ran, both firms were besieged with complaints from their customers about the privacy concerns raised by the program. It is likely these complaints were driven by the following privacy issues: 1) personal information generated as a by-product of the first exchange was shared with a third party, 2) health information is usually perceived as highly sensitive and deserving of strict confidentiality, 3) the information was collected for one purpose, filling a prescription, and was now being used for another unrelated purpose--marketing, and 4) there was a lack of transparency as customers learned about the communication programs from the media rather than from their pharmacist to whom they had entrusted the information. Within two days after the story appeared, both companies ran full-page ads in the Washington Post, announcing they had terminated their relationships with the database marketing firm.
Behind the failure of this effort to provide customers with potentially beneficial health information about drug availability and refill schedules was a lack of sensitivity to customer privacy concerns. Instead of viewing the program as beneficial, customers perceived it as symptomatic of a violation of their privacy. Had these firms= clearly communicated to customers that they were going to use customer information to send them refill reminders and information about relevant new drugs in the market, and described the procedures in place to protect the information including offering an easy Aopt out@ to customers who did not want to receive the marketing solicitations prior to the story appearing in the newspaper, it is likely that most customers would have perceived this program as a benefit and not as a violation of their privacy. Successful management of the second exchange will therefore involves communicating both the benefits of information disclosure and the procedures used to address consumer privacy concerns. We now introduce our conceptual model and present the strategic implications of proper management of the second exchange.
Conceptual Framework: The Model
Much of our model is grounded in marketing theory developed to understand the first exchange. Successful management of the first and second exchanges depends, in part, on communicating to consumers the benefits of the exchanges and reducing perceptions of the risks. For the second exchange, reducing the perceived risks of information disclosure depends essentially on the firm=s attention and sensitivity to consumer information privacy concerns. Development of fair information practices and communicating their use to consumers in order to build trust will therefore be a critical component of the successful management of the second exchange. Also critical is communicating the potential benefits that are associated with information disclosure to the consumer. It is the attractiveness and delivery of these benefits that promote customer satisfaction and build commitment to the relationship. 
Customer Acquisition
Customer acquisition includes attracting new or former customers away from competitors and attracting new customers into the market. Acquiring new customers depends on both the nature of the offering and the customer=s willingness to disclose personal information to the marketer. During the initial transaction when a prospect enters a customer relationship, customer acquisition is typically synonymous with the disclosure of personal information since information is often a by-product of the initial transaction.
Thus, customer acquisition relies, in part, on consumers= willingness to disclose personal information. It is therefore, in the best interest of the firm to develop strategies that both increase the attractiveness of the offering and consumer willingness to disclose personal information. Willingness to disclose personal information is in part based on an assessment of the risks and the benefits associated with information disclosure.
Benefit/Risk Assessment of Information Disclosure
Privacy concerns represent a source of risk that can jeopardize disclosure of personal information if the consumer believes the firm may use their personal information in an opportunistic fashion (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Chiles and McMackin 1996; John 1984; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995) . Research on privacy found that individuals are willing to disclose information in exchange for some economic or social benefit subject to a Aprivacy calculus,@ an assessment that benefits exceed the risks and their personal information will subsequently used fairly (Chiles and McMackin 1996; Laufer and Wolfe 1977; Milne and Gordon 1993; Stone and Stone 1990) . While the self-disclosure literature has focused on interpersonal relationships rather than customer relationships, its findings are consistent regarding a balancing test. People disclose personal information to gain the benefits of a relationship; the benefits of disclosure are balanced with an assessment of the risks of disclosure (Derlega et. al. 1993 ). Thus, consumers will engage in the second exchange because marketers have taken steps to reduce risks and increase benefits. This leads to: P1: The probability of customer acquisition increases when the benefits of the second exchange are perceived to exceed the risks.
Of course a positive assessment of the benefits and risks associated with the second exchange is not in itself sufficient for customer acquisition. As can be seen in Figure 2 , both the first and second exchanges are important to attracting customers based on customer perceptions of benefits and risks. More specifically, a consumer assesses whether or not the offering, the first exchange, is attractive to them. Obviously, offers are targeted at a specific market segment and the same offer will not appeal to everyone. It is our conjecture that prospects will more likely become customers if they perceive that the benefits of the first exchange and the benefits of the second exchange exceed the risks of both respectively. We do recognize that if the benefits of the first exchange are so great that even if the risks of the second exchange exceed the benefits, consumers may still purchase the product if alternatives are not as attractive and the risks are manageable.
However, when privacy is important to a consumer, a negative assessment of the second exchange may cause them to avoid the first exchange. This is especially true in today=s competitive environment where there are often viable alternatives and as such, switching costs are low. Privacy concerns, then, can make consumers unwilling to participate in a marketing relationship. For example, the semiannual Georgia Tech Internet User Surveys regularly find that a majority of respondents have declined to register with a web site because the terms and conditions of how the collected information will be used are not clearly specified (Georgia Tech 1997) . Further, when there is little differentiation among alternatives at the first exchange, attractive and unique benefits associated with the second exchange can be a source of differentiation and could lead to customer acquisition.
-----Insert Figure 2 about here -----
Reducing Perceived Risks of the Second Exchange
The literature on organizational justice suggests that marketers can diminish privacy concerns by incorporating procedural fairness into their information practices for the second exchange (Bies 1993; Culnan 1995; Culnan and Armstrong 1998; Seiders and Berry 1998) . Procedural fairness refers to the perception by the individual that a particular activity in which they are a participant is conducted fairly (Lind and Tyler 1988) . Factors that contribute to perceptions of procedural fairness include providing the consumer with voice and control over actual outcomes (Folger and Greenberg 1985; Lind and Tyler 1988) . Research has shown that even if outcomes are not favorable to an individual, individuals are less likely to be dissatisfied with unfavorable outcomes if they believe that the procedures used to derive those outcomes are fair (Lind and Tyler 1988; Greenberg 1987; Folger and Bies 1989) .
From a consumer marketing context, fair information practices operationalize procedural fairness. Fair information practices are procedures that provide individuals with control over the disclosure and subsequent use of their personal information. They are global standards for the ethical use of personal information and are at the basis for U.S. privacy laws, the privacy directive adopted by the European Union in July 1995, and current Clinton Administration policies (Clinton and Gore 1997; US FTC 1998a) .
At the heart of fair information practices are the following concepts: notice/awareness, choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security and enforcement/redress. When consumers provide personal information, they have the right to know why the information is being collected, its expected uses, the steps that will be taken to protect its confidentiality, integrity and quality, the consequences of providing or withholding information, and any means of redress available to the individual. Consumers also have the right to control how their personal information will subsequently be used by objecting to uses of their personal information when information is collected for one purpose and is used for other purposes (US FTC 1998a).
Fair information practices, therefore, influence privacy concerns raised by disclosure and the subsequent use of personal information by empowering the individual with control and voice, even if people do not choose to invoke the procedures, as well as providing an assurance that the firm will adhere to a set of principles that most customers find acceptable (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Doney and Cannon 1997; Folger and Bies 1989; Folger and Greenberg 1985; Ganesan 1984; Greenberg 1987; Lind and Tyler 1988; Mayer et. al. 1995; Seiders and Berry 1998; Shapiro 1987; Sitkin and Roth 1993; Spence 1974; Stone and Stone 1990 ).
Prior research illustrates how observing fair information practices helps address consumer privacy concerns associated with the second exchange and promotes consumer willingness to disclose information. For consumer marketing, a central tenet of fair information practices is the ability of individuals to remove their names from marketing lists. The Harris privacy surveys have found that the majority of the public believes it is acceptable for organizations to use names and addresses on a mailing list if people who do not want to receive mail offers can remove their names from the list (Harris 1990 , Harris 1996 Harris and Westin 1997) . Culnan (1995) found that people who were aware of name removal (Aopt out@) procedures had a lower concern for privacy than those who were not aware of these procedures, suggesting that awareness of fairness procedures can address the privacy concerns (Greenberg 1987) . Additionally, Culnan and Armstrong (1998) found that when customers are explicitly told that fair information practices are employed, privacy concerns no longer distinguish those who are willing to have the personal information they disclosed used for targeted marketing from those who are unwilling to have their personal information used in this way. This leads to:
P2: Communicating to consumers that a firm observes fair information practices will be associated with lower perceived risk of the second exchange.
Increasing Perceived Benefits of the Second Exchange
In addition to communicating to consumers the procedures used to minimize the privacy risks of disclosing personal information, firms also need to communicate the benefits of disclosure. In some instances, the benefits are clear. For example, grocery stores promote the discounts that customers who enroll in a frequent shopper will receive.
These types of second exchange benefits can differentiate a firm=s offerings from those of the competition and lead to consumer acquisition. In other instances where the benefits are not obvious such as the prescription non-compliance communication program described above, or accrue to the customer indirectly, a more concerted communication effort will be required. For example, the Georgia Tech Internet Survey found that respondents feel that it is often not worth disclosing their personal information to access a web site, suggesting that firms have not made a persuasive case for the benefits that accrue from these disclosures (Georgia Tech 1997). Communication of attractive benefits may make consumers more willing to give up some privacy to obtain these benefits. Thus, the failure to make the positive case for disclosure means the consumer may be more likely to view the disclosure as risky and leads to: P3: Communicating the benefits to the consumer of the second exchange will be associated with a more positive overall assessment of the second exchange.
We now move to a discussion of the importance of the second exchange to customer retention.
Customer Retention
A relationship marketing orientation recognizes the benefits of maintaining longterm commitments from consumers. Customer retention is clearly a key factor in a firm=s success and profitability. For example, a five percent reduction in customer defection rates was shown to improve profitability of firms from 25 to 85 percent (Triplett 1994) . In addition, the average profit per customer has been shown to increase in many industries as the time in the relationship increases (Reichheld 1996) . Moreover, the costs of retaining existing customers are also far below those of acquiring new ones (Klopp and Sterlickhi 1990 ; Pepper and Rogers 1991) . Central to improving customer retention is creating and maintaining customer trust, satisfaction, loyalty, and turning that loyalty into repeat purchases.
Privacy Expectation/Outcome Assessment: Trust and Satisfaction
A key factor identified as necessary for successful relationship marketing is trust (Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1984; Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman 1993; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Schurr and Ozanne 1985; Smith and Barclay 1997; Swan, Trawick and Silva 1985) . Drawing on the literature on trust, Morgan and Hunt (1994, p. 23 ) define trust as Awhen one party has confidence in an exchange partner=s reliability and integrity.@ Underlying this definition is a willingness to take a risk. The risk that is raised by disclosing personal information is that the firm will engage in opportunism and use the information in ways that the consumers finds unacceptable or that results in harm (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Chiles and McMackin 1996; John 1984) . Developing information practices that address perceived privacy risks result in positive experiences with the firm over time, increasing the customer=s perceptions that the firm can be trusted (Chiles and McMackin 1996; John 1984; Smith and Barclay 1997) .
Managing information privacy encompasses, at a rudimentary level, two important areas: developing the company=s official information privacy policies and the management of these policies through day-to day practices (Mintzberg 1973; Simon 1976) . Since trust reflects the extent of one party=s confidence that it can rely on another=s integrity to follow through on promises, maintaining trust and hence retaining customers requires that firms= information practices be consistent with their stated policies. In other words, companies
need to Asay what they do@ and Ado what they say.@ If information privacy practices are at odds with stated policies consumers are likely to feel betrayed (Fournier et. al. 1998; Oliver and Swan 1989) . Companies who do not keep their promises at either the first or second exchange point may destroy trust and the possibility of continuing the buyer-seller relationship (Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Oliver and Swan 1989; Smith and Barclay 1997) . Positive interactions help to build long-term customer trust and relationships while negative ones destroy them. Therefore, if a firm does not follow through on its information privacy policies, consumer trust will be diminished.
Thus, we postulate:
P4: Firms= privacy practices that are inconsistent with their privacy policies will negatively impact consumer trust.
According to the expectancy disconfirmation model of consumer satisfaction, consumers= expectations prior to consumption act as a standard against which a firm=s performance is measured (Bearden and Teel 1983; Churchill and Surprenant 1982; Oliver 1980 ). The higher the expectation relative to actual performance, the greater the level of disconfirmation and the lower consumer satisfaction (Bearden and Teel 1983; Tse and Wilson 1988) . Since transactions include both the exchange of goods and information, dissatisfaction with products (the first exchange) may not be the only determinant of consumer satisfaction. If a firm establishes high second exchange benefit expectations that are then disconfirmed by actual outcomes, consumers will likely be dissatisfied with the second exchange in the marketing relationship. For example, frequent shopper programs that require information disclosure often recruit customers by promising that they will receive reduced prices (coupons) on products they purchase. However, if customers receive coupons for products that are of little interest to them instead of coupons for products they regularly purchase, they are likely to be dissatisfied with the program.
Dissatisfaction may also result for frequent flier programs that make it difficult to redeem miles, or for customized offers printed on billing statements where customers are promised offers of interest to them when none result. Therefore, we posit that: P5: When second exchange benefit expectations exceed outcomes, consumer satisfaction with the second exchange will be low.
Trust, Satisfaction, and Relationship Commitment
Along with trust and consumer satisfaction, another key factor identified as necessary for successful relationship marketing is relationship commitment (Morgan and Hunt 1994) . Relationship commitment has been defined as Aan enduring desire to maintain a valued relationship@ (Moorman et. al. 1992, p. 316) .
1 Commitment among exchange partners is central to achieving valuable outcomes for both parties. Providing superior benefits, promoting the firm=s values (e.g., privacy), and creating a trustworthy image can build relationship commitment (Morgan and Hunt 1994) .
Trust is a major determinant of relationship commitment; it is the glue that holds relationships together (Moorman et. al. 1992; Morgan and Hunt 1994) . Trust is diminished when parties do not meet their commitments and relationships are destroyed when parties do not trust each other. As Morgan and Hunt (1994) state, this causal relationship can be explained by the reciprocity principle from social exchange theory which posits that
Amistrust breeds mistrust and as such would also serve to decrease commitment in the relationship and shift the transaction to one of more direct short-term exchanges@ (McDonald 1981, p. 834) . Therefore, if consumer trust is diminished because marketers= information privacy practices are incongruent with consumer expectations, relationship commitment will be negatively impacted. We therefore propose:
P6: Lower levels of trust related to the second exchange will be associated with lower levels of relationship commitment.
Additionally, when parties are satisfied with the second exchange they are also more likely to be committed to the relationship and committed parties have a greater propensity to stay in the relationship (Mathieu and Zajac 1990; Morgan and Hunt 1994) . Since consumer satisfaction may be dependent on satisfaction with both the first and the second exchanges, customers dissatisfied with either exchange may be less likely to be committed and to continue the relationship. As Figure 3 illustrates, even customers who are satisfied with the product or service (first exchange) may nonetheless defect if they are dissatisfied with the way the firm uses the personal information they disclosed as part of the second exchange (as the example of the customer who sued U.S. News and World Report described previously illustrates). Therefore, firms that satisfy their customers through both the first and second exchanges are more likely to enjoy customer loyalty and repeat sales; customers dissatisfied with either the first or second exchanges are less likely to be brand or company loyal, and/or to repeat purchase. This suggests:
P7: Lower consumer satisfaction with the second exchange will be associated with lower levels of relationship commitment.
C Insert Figure 3 About Here C Further, as committed parties have a higher propensity to remain in a relationship and repeat purchase, loyal and satisfied customers are a revenue-generating asset to a firm (Anderson, Fornell and Lehmann 1994) . Thus, establishing and maintaining committed customer relationships is a strategic imperative as firms are more likely to retain committed customers, which in turn, affects companies= revenues. Based on the above discussion we postulate that:
P8:
Lower relationship commitment related to the second exchange will be associated with lower customer retention.
P9:
Lower customer retention related to the second exchange will be associated with lower firm profitability.
Termination Costs
While relationship commitment influences consumers= propensity to terminate the relationship with a firm, whether consumers choose to do so may be moderated by the costs associated with ending the relationship. Much as termination costs are associated with the first exchange, the ending of the second exchange can also be costly to the customer. This is particularly true for customer loyalty programs where benefits accrue over time and cannot be transferred to another firm. For example, airlines are able to identify and reward their best passengers based on membership in a loyalty program.
Customers who have accrued a million frequent flier miles (the second exchange) by repeatedly purchasing airline tickets (the first exchange) from one airline are typically treated better than other customers (Leonhardt and Zellner 1998) .
Additionally, trust creates switching costs, increasing the likelihood that the customer will continue in the relationship with the firm (Gundlach and Murphy 1993) . For example, 43% of consumers participating in a frequent buyer or customer loyalty program said they think that these programs cause them to make more purchases, and 16% said these programs make them Astick with one store@ (McLaughlin 1998) . Thus, in the current marketing environment where the increase in attractive choice alternatives has decreased the barriers to customers switching, it is important for firms to create and deliver attractive benefits associated with the disclosure of consumer information to increase termination costs.
The Second Exchange and the Bottom Line: Corporate Reputation and Business Performance
One goal of a more strategic approach to managing the second exchange should be to enhance a firm=s corporate reputation. Corporate reputation can be affected by both perceptions of its citizenship behavior and word-of-mouth (Morgan and Hunt 1994) . For example, recent public opinion surveys indicate that privacy concerns are high (Harris and Westin 1997) . Therefore, instituting privacy policies and practices that satisfy consumer privacy concerns can contribute to the development of positive corporate reputation as well as positive word-of-mouth.
On the other hand, customer dissatisfaction or distrust can lead to negative wordof-mouth which in turn, can adversely affect a firm=s reputation (Fornell and Didow 1980; Gilly and Gelb 1982) . This can create difficulty for firms as they try to attract new customers, in that negative word-of-mouth tends to be highly persuasive and consumers place a great deal of weight on it when making purchasing decisions (Yi 1992) . Further, negative word-of-mouth can be particularly problematic for firms as the growth of the Internet and other online systems make it possible for consumers to engage in Aelectronic retaliation@ if they are dissatisfied with a company=s practices, by Aflaming@ the company directly by electronic mail (Bies and Tripp 1996) , or by posting negative public comments to a computer discussion group. As the text of Internet discussion groups are archived and can be easily searched by keyword such as company or product name, these negative comments live on long after they were posted. Thus, if current and potential customers avoid firms with poor reputations based on the second exchange, the firms= financial performance will also likely be adversely affected. Based on the above discussion we postulate that:
P10a: Level of trust related to the second exchange will be positively associated with a firm=s corporate reputation and financial performance.
P10b:
Consumer satisfaction related to the second exchange will be positively associated with a firm=s corporate reputation and financial performance.
Discussion
This paper introduces the concept of the second exchange in customer relationships that is distinct from the first exchange of money for goods or services. The second exchange is based on the personal information customers disclose in the course of a marketing relationship where personal information is exchanged for benefits derived from the use of the information. Conceptualizing these information flows as a second exchange opens up a new understanding of the critical role of information in relationship marketing, and its strategic implications for the firm. Typically, companies have developed elaborate strategies for managing the first exchange--product development, promotion, pricing, and distribution--but have no strategy for managing the second exchange. In reality, the first and second exchanges are intimately linked. Of course even the successful management of the second exchange cannot by itself ensure that customers will engage in the first exchange. However, overall management of both the first and second exchanges has strategic implications for customer acquisition and retention and as a result, should result in improved competitive standing and financial performance. We also present arguments that managing the second exchange through fair information practices is the key to addressing consumer privacy concerns and building trust that is essential to sustaining long-term customer relationships that depend on consumer willingness to disclose personal information.
Thus, a primary contribution of the paper is the development of the concept of the second exchange and a model that demonstrates the importance of the second exchange to acquiring and retaining customers. Another contribution of this research is to extend the reach of existing marketing theory. There is a shortage of research on the role of trust in creating and sustaining consumer marketing relationships. Much of the prior research addressed the role of trust in industrial marketing or in distribution channel relationships (see for example Doney and Cannon 1997) . Our paper extends theories in these other contexts to consumer marketing relationships, as well as extending theory developed for the first exchange in consumer marketing to the second exchange. Finally, the paper demonstrates that the privacy concerns raised by the second exchange can be managed by observing fair information practices; managing privacy in this way can present an opportunity rather than a threat to organizations by building trust and avoiding unwanted government regulation.
Directions for Future Research
It is important to test the propositions we generated from our model to see to what extent marketing theory developed for the first exchange can be applied to the second exchange. Future research should address the relationship between the second exchange and both customer acquisition and customer retention, and how they are influenced by other variables in the model including customer satisfaction and trust.
There is a clear need for theoretically grounded research to test the risks-benefits linkages we propose for customer acquisition. For example, what tradeoffs between the first exchange and the second exchange do consumers make, and how are these tradeoffs moderated by experience, contextual and demographic variables? What types of benefits would allow consumers to accept some loss of privacy? What type of initial disclosures about benefits and procedures used to address privacy risks are adequate to assure a consumer that it is safe to enter in a relationship with a firm? What are the best ways (e.g., third party assurances that the firm will Ado what it says@ such as a AGood Housekeeping@ seal) to communicate privacy policies to reduce perceived risks of information disclosure (Schurr and Ozanne 1985; Shapiro 1987; Zucker 1986 are congruent with those of the consumer (Sitkin and Roth 1993) . Sitkin and Roth (1993) also suggest that context-specific violations of trust which consist of isolated incidents do not disrupt trust. Only when the customer perceives that repeated violations may occur within the same context or may generalize to other interactions of a particular type is trust broken (Sitkin and Roth 1993; Zucker 1986 ). These ideas need to be tested empirically.
Implications for Marketing Practice
The primary implications for marketing practice is the imperative for firms to develop an explicit strategy for managing consumer information as an exchange that at a minimum clearly communicates to consumers the benefits of information disclosure and the procedures implemented to minimize privacy risks. Generally, marketers have not effectively communicated to consumers the benefits associated with information disclosure.
Awareness and attractiveness of these benefits is likely to increase consumer willingness to disclose information and accept some loss of privacy.
Marketers, have also not adequately developed strategies for reducing the privacy risks associated with information disclosure. Managing privacy concerns in particular presents particular challenges to organizations as today, concerns for privacy are at an all time high and calls for government regulation of corporate privacy practices are increasing (See for example US FTC 1998a; US FTC 1998b) . To gain the benefits that the flows of personal information from the second exchange can provide, the firm needs to operationalize the fairness concepts -fair information practices -described previously.
Technology potentially makes customer data highly accessible throughout the organization and enables decentralized decision-making. If fair information practices are not embedded in the work practices of all employees, there is a risk that a customer service or marketing representative may allow personal information to be used in a way that is at odds with the customers= norms for acceptable use, resulting in a customer, media, or regulatory backlash. For example, an employee of a large database company allowed a television reporter using the name of a well-known pedophile to acquire a list of children in a California suburb using a personal credit card. While the transaction violated company policies, it nonetheless resulted in negative publicity for the firm.
Institutionalizing a "culture of privacy" within the organization involves more than creating a policy that is disclosed to customers. A senior manager needs to champion privacy. Employees need to be trained and retrained. Periodic audits should be conducted There is evidence that few U.S. marketers have developed strategies for managing privacy concerns associated with the second exchange. For example, Smith (1995) studied how seven different organizations in four industries responded to growing public concerns about privacy. He observed a three-phase cycle of response: drift, external threat, and reaction. Rather than address privacy issues proactively, these firms delegated responsibility for privacy to lower-level managers. New policies were developed only in response to an external threat or crisis. The Federal Trade Commission=s survey of 1400 web sites found that on average, only 14% had any type of disclosure about the firm=s information practices, despite the fact that both the study itself and the fact that the results would be used to make recommendations to Congress about the need for legislation were widely publicized before the study was conducted (US FTC, 1998).
As these examples illustrate, most firms have had a reactive rather than a strategic orientation to consumer privacy in particular for two reasons. First, firms seem to believe that there is no readily apparent competitive dynamic in the consumer information privacy arena that justifies a more strategic approach (Baker 1973; Jones 1991) . In particular, firms perceive that privacy concerns are not affecting the bottom line.
Second, firms perceive that the risks of adopting a more proactive stance toward privacy may outweigh the benefits. For example, Osterhus (1997) argues that there are two types of risks that account for why firms do not adopt pro-social policies. First, if a firm is discovered to have practices that do not match its privacy claims, this can lead to decreased sales or litigation. Second, there is no assurance that the benefits of taking a proactive approach to privacy such as potentially increasing market share will outweigh the costs. Therefore, most firms approach consumer privacy issues as problems to be resolved or constraints to be managed rather than market opportunities to be leveraged into strategic advantages. However, others argue that relationships built on trust are less costly to maintain than those that rely on more legalistic forms of control (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Chiles and McMackin 1996; John 1984 (Menon and Menon 1997) .
A reasonable assessment of the current environment in corporate privacy management would place most firms between the first and the second category at present, treating privacy issues in a defensive or a reactive fashion. Thus, if the analogy to environmental issues holds, than a more strategic approach, i.e., treating consumer information explicitly as part of a second exchange, can provide benefits to firms. More specifically, this strategic approach can 1) create opportunities for competitive advantage by improving customer acquisition and retention and 2) avoid external threats of legislative reactivity and of escalating consumer information privacy concerns.
There are three emerging issues where consumer privacy concerns potentially threaten business interests that suggest it is in the self-interest of marketers to manage the second exchange strategically. First, implementation of the European Union (EU) Privacy Directive could restrict flows of personal information from our European trading partners to the United States if the current self-regulatory regime is viewed by the Europeans as inadequate (Dresner 1996) . As such, the EU Directive is putting pressure on United States firms to implement meaningful privacy practices.
Second, there is evidence that consumer privacy concerns may also be affecting the level of government involvement in regulating corporate information practices (Milberg et. al. 1995, Milberg, Smith, and Burke 1998) . Legislation is often introduced in response to media accounts of perceived privacy-invasive practices by business. For example, shortly after the pharmaceutical marketing story appeared in the Washington Post, legislation was introduced to restrict the disclosure of prescription information by pharmacies. Further, as consumer information privacy concerns have steadily risen in the U.S. so have government restrictions on marketers= activities. For example, the use of consumer transaction data has been restricted in many states (Cespedes and Smith 1993) . The Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission recently testified that unless industry demonstrates that it has implemented effective self-regulatory programs by the end of 1998, additional government authority related to privacy would be necessary and appropriate (US FTC, 1998b) . Thus, if marketers fail to adequately address these issues it is appears that they may face a number of regulatory challenges that may infringe on their continued use of consumer information.
Such an outcome represents a scenario that most marketers claim they would like to avoid as regulation typically increases the cost of doing business and thereby threatens competitiveness.
Third, there is also evidence that consumers= privacy concerns may threaten the growth of electronic commerce. A recent public opinion survey found that privacy concerns were the main reason consumers did not go online (Green 1998) . A Louis Harris survey found similar results: 87% of people who had been asked to register when visiting a web site declined to do so or provided false information (Harris and Westin 1997) . Failure to satisfactorily address these concerns at a national level, then, potentially threatens the economic competitiveness of the United States and raises the possibility of new legislation (Clinton and Gore, 1997) . Therefore, marketers cannot afford to continue their current approach to managing consumer information into the indefinite future, as many initiatives restricting its use are looming on the horizon.
In the competitive global economy, information is a key to creating and sustaining successful consumer marketing relationships. Information technology will continue to advance, creating opportunities that can provide consumers with benefits and firms with competitive advantage, assuming that firms manage the associated privacy risks to the satisfaction of their customers. To address these challenges, in the twenty-first century successful marketers will need to change how they typically view the acquisition and use of consumer information from a one-way proposition to an exchange process and adopt strategies for managing both the first and second exchanges. 
